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Abstract—Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) is a subfield
of cryptography that allows multiple parties to compute jointly on
a function without revealing their inputs to others. The technology
is able to solve potential privacy issues that arises when a
trusted third party is involved, like a server. This paper aims to
evaluate implementations of Secure Multiparty Computation and
its viability for practical use. The paper also seeks to understand
and state the challenges and concepts of Secure Multiparty
Computation through the construction of a home loan calculation
application. Encryption over MPC is done within 2 to 2.5 Seconds.
Up to 10K addition operations, MPC system performs very well
and most applications will be sufficient within 10K additions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional methods of aggregating data for computing on a
function relies on a trusted third party to perform the function.
Consider the example of data analytics. Data analytics can only
be done when a organization collects personal data about their
users. This creates a huge privacy issue as companies can gain
private insights of individuals based on such data, especially
if this data is aggregated from multiple sources [1]. A simple
example would be shopping habits of customers; a company
can derive a person’s health through the products that they
buy. If a person constantly buys products that remove acne,
data analytics can reveal that this person has acne, which is
something that an individual might not want to reveal to a
public entity.
Secure Multiparty Computation is a field of cryptography
that explores joint computation of a function with inputs from
different parties while keeping each party’s inputs private. Se-
cure Multiparty Computation can resolve these privacy issues
as it generalizes the existence of a trusted third party into
the security of cryptographic protocols. Research into specific
fields like data mining [2] have been done with the same
motivation, and shows the wide ranging use cases of the field.
Secure Multiparty Computation is a subset of cryptography
that has been not been used practically due to efficiency.
However, recent developments in Secure Multiparty protocols
have made it more efficient and more viable for practical
implementation.
The aim of this paper is to create an application using
a Secure Multi Party Computation (MPC) framework to
compute home loan installments. This application will then
be used to evaluate the MPC framework and determine the
viability of MPC in practical usage. During the process of
deciding to buy a home, buyers would calculate the required
costs to determine if they are eligible and able to afford, which
requires private inputs from different parties. The intention of
this paper is to evaluate the use of the FRESCO (a FRamework
for Efficient Secure COmputation) MPC framework in its
current state and implementations of its Secure Multi Party
Computation protocols. The focus is on usability and imple-
mentation of the framework. Since practical implementations
of Secure Multiparty Computation are relatively new and
undocumented, this paper seeks to implement a sample sce-
nario to verify usability of current frameworks that implement
Secure Multiparty Computation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the concepts and developments of Secure Multiparty
Computation. Section III explores the context of home loans.
Section IV defines the identified requirements that a Home
Loan Calculation application should fulfill. Section V describes
the system design. Section VI details the phases and descrip-
tion of the implementation of the Home Loan Calculation
Application. Section VII discusses the experiments conducted
to evaluate the implementation of FRESCO. Section VIII
concludes this paper and potential future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Secure Multiparty Computation
The concept of Secure Multiparty Computation was intro-
duced by Yao in his paper introducing the classic millionaires’
problem [3]. More specifically, Yao presents the problem as
a generalized problem involving the use of multiple parties.
Given a function f(xi · · ·xn) and number of parties n, can
function f be computed among the n participants among
themselves such that each person Pi only knows its own input
xi and the output of function f? Yao’s proposed solution for
this problem in the paper is a secure two party protocol.
Yao’s solution is based on party P1 giving P2 a list of
possible values, with P2 inputting his values into the list of
possible values, upon which is returned to P1 who is then
able to securely evaluate a boolean function f(x1, x2) by
selecting the correct entry in the list of values to evaluate the
function. While his solution is a two party secure computation,
his generalization of the problem opened the idea of secure
multiparty computation and contextualized it. There are two
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main secure multiparty computation approaches: circuit gar-
bling and secret sharing schemes. Before explaining further on
Secure Multiparty Computation concepts some terms must be
defined. This section explains the terminologies that will be
used in describing protocols for the rest of the paper.
1) Oblivious Transfer: In Oblivious Transfer, the sender
sends a list of information to the receiver, while remaining
unaware of what information that it has transferred. The above
construction of solution is an example of Oblivious Transfer.
Oblivious transfer is also used as a cryptographic primitive in
many secure multiparty protocols.
An example of oblivious transfer is the 1 of 2 oblivious
transfer. In this protocol, there is a sender Alice and receiver
Bob. Bob desires a message from Alice, but does not wish
Alice to know which information that Bob has requested [4].
Such a protocol can be implemented with any public key en-
cryption. Generally, this protocol requires a few prerequisites.
Alice as the sender has msg0 and msg1 messages that could
potentially be the message that Bob desires. Bob has a bit b
that corresponds to the message that he desires from Alice and
does not want to let Alice knows which message he wants. The
protocol can be implemented using any public key encryption
schemes. This protocol has been generalized to a 1 out of
n oblivious transfer where the there can be more than two
inputs [5].
2) Circuits: Logic Circuits are a model of computation for
cryptography. A logic circuit is defined by their size depth i.e
the length of their longest path. Logic circuits are also circuits
whose operations are in Boolean [6]. They are often referred
to Boolean Circuit in the cryptography literature.
B. Homomorphism
Gentry proposed a fully homomorphic scheme in his pa-
per using lattices [7]. He defined fully homormophic public
encryption scheme as a scheme that contains the functions:
1) fkeygen that generates the key, 2) fencrypt that encrypts
a plaintext, 3) fdecrypt that decrypts a cipher text, and 4)
fcompute that computes a circuit based on input ciphertext
generated by fencrypt and outputs a ciphertext c that is result
of the circuit. In addition to these functions, such a scheme
should support any circuit. Gentry also describes different
kinds of homomorphisms based on the lattice structure. These
homomorphisms are additive homomorphism and multiplica-
tive homomorphism [7].
1) Additive Homomorphism: Generally a scheme is addi-
tively homomorphic when plaintext values x and y satisfy the
following condition:
fencrypt
(
x
)
+ fencrypt
(
y
)
= fencrypt
(
x+ y
)
The property implies that any addition of
cipheri, · · · , ciphern ciphertexts using the same encryption
scheme gives the same result when computing the plaintext.
2) Multiplicative Homomorphism: A scheme is multiplica-
tive homomorphic when plaintext values x and y satisfy the
following condition:
fencrypt
(
x
)× fencrypt(y) = fencrypt(x× y)
The property implies that any multiplication of
cipheri, · · · , ciphern ciphertexts using the same encryption
scheme gives the same result when computing the plaintext.
C. Yao’s Garbling Circuit
Yao’s influence for secure multiparty computation was
extended further with his proposals to solve his original
millionaire’s problem. Known as Yao’s Garbling Circuit, it
relies on the use of circuits as a model of computation for
computing a function. Using circuits, the idea is to encrypt
the circuit to be computed, creating a “garbled” version of the
circuit [8].
Yao’s protocol starts with the garbling/encryption of the
circuit. In this case we assume Alice and Bob, with Alice being
the “garbler” and Bob being the “evaluator”. Alice provides the
circuit on which to compute on, which is garbled by her. Alice
will send the garbled circuit and use the oblivious transfer
primitive to send her garbled inputs to Bob. Bob then decrypts
the circuit to obtain the encrypted outputs. Alice and Bob then
communicate to reveal the final value of the output. Basically,
the idea of the protocol is to provide a way to compute a
function where values obtained on a circuit wire would not be
revealed, with the exception of the output wire’s value [9].
D. Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir [10] introduced a problem first formulated by
Liu [11] as a background to his paper. Secret Sharing is a
cryptographic primitive dealing with the problem of sharing
a secret among n parties such that the secret can only be
revealed upon combining t number of shares from the parties.
Shamir’s scheme is a threshold scheme, or a
(
k,n
)
threshold
scheme [10]. Given the secret S divided into n parts, the
following properties apply:
1) Reconstructible: Knowledge of k parts of the secret
can easily reconstruct S,
2) Secrecy: Knowledge of k − 1 parts of the secret
do not allow reconstruction of S; furthermore all
permutations of S is possible at k-1 parts.
Since Shamir’s scheme is based on interpolation of poly-
nomials, every share of secret value u JuK is a point of f(x).
Given also a sharing of another secret v as JvK and n number
of parties we observe that:
Ju+ vKi = JuiK + JviK
u+v = Funcdec
(Ju+vKi, Ju+vKi+1, ......Ju+vKn)
Adding different shares of different secrets creates a new share
based on the sum of the secrets. When these secrets are shared
with at least k parts, then we can compute the real value of
the sum of the two secret values [12].
III. BACKGROUND OF HOME LOANS
This section details the background of home loans in
Singapore. Described in this section includes the context and
scenario needed to make the application work.
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A. Overview of Home Loan Privacy
In Singapore, Property Agents are service people who
help home buyers with the financial paperwork when purchas-
ing a home [13][14]. These property agents also help consult
potential buyers on the home that they wish to buy, which
includes the financial aspect of affording the home. Typically,
this presents privacy problems, as the calculation of the amount
requires information that intrudes on the privacy of the home
buyer
(
i.e., savings
)
. In addition, when a property agent
consults a buyer based on the financial aspects of the potential
home purchase, the lender
(
i.e., banks
)
of any potential loan
taken is not involved in the consultation. Finally, in Singapore,
the social security system CPF can help pay for part of the
home cost.
These entities
(
buyer, bank, CPF
)
are required for accurate
computation of a home purchase, but they are not connected
together; to do so would incur privacy loss on the part of the
buyer, as the full calculation would reveal private information
the user has in the three entities. The rest of this section
shall elaborate on the details of the overview that is presented.
Section III-B explains the overview in Singapore’s context and
section IV will show the high level overview of the application.
B. Context
In Singapore, up to 80% of the population stay in pub-
lic housing built by the government, also known as HDB
flats [15]. There are also different kinds of HDB flats, with
different prices for each [16]. While there are also a sizable
number of population who possess private housing, the appli-
cation will explore the purchase of public housing flats as it is
a more general case for a higher percentage of the population
in Singapore. In addition, we can also generalize the scenario
into a more global context.
The model for this application is using the Singapore hous-
ing context. This application uses Singapore’s public housing
payment model and conditions
(
HDB flats
)
for buying a flat to
compute home loan installments. The rest of the section shall
explain the concepts of the scenario in more detail.
1) Central Provident Fund: In Singapore, the Central
Provident Fund
(
CPF
)
is a social security system that helps
working Singapore Citizens and Permanent Residents
(
PR
)
to save enough for their retirement [17]. The scheme also
provides the use of a citizen’s/PR’s funds for certain purposes
like housing and health care.
CPF also allows use of funds for purchase of a house [18].
In particular, a buyer of a HDB home can pay part of the
cost of the house using their funds held in CPF. The amount
of which can be paid is dependent on various factors, most
notably that it cannot exceed the amount that a user has in his
account with CPF.
2) Total Debt Servicing Ratio And Monthly Debt Servicing
Ratio: In Singapore, a condition for being able to take a loan
from the bank is the Total Debt Servicing Ratio
(
TDSR
)
[19].
TDSR is a loan limit using a person’s monthly income. For
Singapore, the TDSR cap is 60% of a person’s monthly income
that a user can use to service his monthly debt repayments [20].
In HDB loans, the monthly debt servicing ratio (MSR)
applies instead [21]. However, they are the same thing, just
that the cap is different at 30% and only applies for HDB flats.
We choose to generalize all debt upper bound calculation as
MSR in the application.
3) Downpayment: The purchase of a HDB flat can be
separated into two portions: the downpayment and the loan.
This section will explain the downpayment portion of the
scheme. When purchasing a HDB flat, a buyer can choose
either a HDB housing loan or a bank loan [22]. Since they are
both loans operating on similar principles, this section shall
explain the HDB loan as a example for explanation.
HDB requires that if a bank loan is taken to pay for the
purchase of a HDB flat then the buyer has to pay 20% of the
purchase price as downpayment [22]. Of this 20%, at least 5%
of the purchase price must be paid in cash, with the balance is
payable using the buyer’s CPF funds under the CPF scheme
for public housing [18].
4) Home Loan: This section will explain the loan portion
of the loan scheme that we are using. Home loans are amor-
itizing loans [23][24]. Amoritizing loans work by calculating
interest on a annual basis. The interest is calculated by taking
the outstanding amount owed and multiplying it by the interest.
HDB loans are fixed rate loans pegged to the CPF interest
rate. To calculate the monthly installment, we use the Equated
Monthly Installment formula. The formula reads as follows:
A = P · 1−(1+r)n(1+r)n−1
Where A is the monthly installment, P the princi-
pal/outstanding amount, r the interest rate and n the repayment
period in months.
IV. REQUIREMENTS
This section will state the structure and purpose of the
application created in this paper.
A. Problem Statement
Calculating the financial details of buying a new HDB
flat is often a complicated process that requires private data
of the buyer(i.e., savings, debt) from many different sources.
These private data should ideally be secured from any other
parties other than the buyer himself. However, current methods
of calculation still require knowledge of the private values
to allow actual calculation to happen. These problems are
somewhat mitigated as the parties involved are segregated from
one another, only using the output (i.e., Yes or No for checking
if savings are enough) of each party to carry on the calculation.
While this ensures the secrecy aspect, this can only be done
when the actual purchase of home happens, a buyer would
not be able to calculate the estimated costs securely as he
needs to reveal information to a property agent for him to
get consultation on his potential purchase.
B. The Solution
We aim to solve individual privacy by aggregating the three
entities (CPF, Bank, Buyer) data for calculating estimated loan
installment amount. This aggregation of private data will be
done via the use of Secure Multiparty Computation techniques.
The data we wish to protect are the buyer’s monthly salary,
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CPF amount in CPF, savings and debt that are recorded in
banks. Secure Multiparty Computation is a relatively new
field of cryptography, and we analyze the potential uses of
implementations of SMPC frameworks at its current state using
this problem as a model to evaluate.
C. Parties
The three entities that were identified for the solution are:
1) CPF, 2) Buyer, and 3) Bank. Each party other than the
buyer is required to provide some private details that they
cannot share with any other party to calculate the monthly
installment when purchasing a property selected by the buyer.
In section IV-D, a high level description of what calculations
need to be done is detailed, from which we can infer which
values each party is require to provide for calculating a home
loan’s monthly installment.
In our solution, a trusted third party is not desired in
computing the home loan; the only parties are the parties
listed in this section, and they jointly compute the calculation
together.
1) CPF: CPF only needs to provide one value: Amount
Usable in CPF account. This value must remain secret, as the
the amount that a buyer can use from his account must not be
known to the bank. The value is needed as it is required for
calculating the downpayment for a HDB flat.
2) Buyer: The buyer party is required to provide the
following values:1) 30% of their monthly salary, 2) Repay-
ment period in months, 3) Minimum amount of money for
downpayment for chosen HDB flat, 4) Minimum amount of
money required in CPF for the chosen HDB flat, 5) Maximum
amount loanable for the chosen HDB flat. The only value here
that needs to be secret is the buyer’s 30% of monthly salary.
The remaining values can be public, as they are based on
the buyer’s choice of HDB flat. Those values are needed to
calculate the monthly installment of a loan, and to verify the
buyer’s eligibility for a loan.
3) Bank: The bank is required to provide the following
values: 1) Buyer’s Existing Debt, 2) Buyer’s Savings, and 3)
Interest of loan. All the values from the bank except interest are
required to be secret, as these are private details of the buyer.
Interest is needed to calculate the loan’s monthly installment.
D. Calculating a HDB Home Loan’s Monthly Installment
Based on the context described in section III-B, there are
several preconditions for getting a HDB home loan. They are
as follows:
1) the Total Debt Servicing Ratio/Monthly Debt Servic-
ing Ratio threshold,
2) Amount of cash the buyer has on hand to pay the
downpayment,
3) the CPF funds usable to pay the downpayment.
A buyer has to ensure that he does not exceed the TD-
SR/MSR threshold, has enough money he has on hand and
also enough money that he can use in his CPF account before
he can be eligible to buy a HDB flat. Based on the context,
we can detail the steps required to calculate a home loan.
1) Determine TDSR/MSR limit and see if loan is al-
lowed to be acquired.
2) Determine if buyer’s CPF funds and cash on hand is
enough to pay the 20% downpayment.
3) Calculate the monthly installment using the Equated
Monthly Installment formula.
4) Add the calculated installment value to existing debt
and recheck TDSR.
V. SYSTEM DESIGN
Two experimental versions and a prototype of the home
loan calculation application were created in this paper, in
accordance to the requirements discussed in section III. This
section details the different phases during the implementation
and the decisions made on evaluating the technology used.
A. Overview
The system architecture is shown in Figure 1. The system
implementation was conducted in phases. These phases were:
1) Evaluation of Protocols in FRESCO (as discussed in
Section II)
2) Implementation of a simple interest calculation appli-
cation prototype
3) Implementation of a amortizing loan calculation ap-
plication prototype
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Fig. 1: System architecture
The implementation was conducted in the order shown
above. Firstly, the frameworks Sharemind [25] and FRESCO
were shortlisted and evaluated for use in implementing the
requirements as discussed in Section IV. After choosing the
framework, the protocols used in the framework were eval-
uated for use,with attempts to create simple prototypes and
functions; this protocol evaluation will be discussed in section
VI-A. After that, true implementation of the requirements as
discussed in Section IV were created using the protocol. Two
implementations were created, as proof of concept implemen-
tations because of technical reasons that will be discussed in
Section VII.
B. Investigation of the FRESCO framework
FRESCO is a framework that is designed for users to easily
write prototypes based on secure computation. It allows rapid
and simple application and protocol suite development as well
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as a flexible design pattern with support for large and efficient
computations [26]. FRESCO abstracts the idea of different
protocol suites to create a plug and play framework. This is
achieved by FRESCO’s Protocol Producer/Consumer Pattern.
1) Usability: FRESCO is a framework that is easily exten-
sible and flexible; users can define a protocol that they wish
to use to evaluate a certain function. In that sense, protocols
are decoupled from application development; developers just
need to specify a function like addition that they wish to
calculate without knowing about its specifics, which FRESCO
calls the Abstract Factory Pattern [27]. FRESCO envisions
that applications using this pattern can be run on multiple
different protocol suites, using common operations to act as
a abstraction from the protocols when developing.
FRESCO is a relatively new framework that has been
around since 2015. Developed by Alexandra Institute’s security
lab [28], it is written in Java and licensed under the open source
MIT license [26]. Currently it is in its first unstable version,
version 0.1.0. It uses SCAPI as the underlying networking
protocol for use in its application and currently has three
protocol suites that are implemented.
2) Protocols: These protocol suites are:
• the Dummy protocol suite,
• the BGW Protocol suite,
• the SPDZ protocol suite.
The Dummy protocol suite has no security and is used as a
measure for the basis overhead of FRESCO [29]. The BGW
and SPDZ protocols will be explored in the later sections of
this section.
The BGW protocol is a protocol used in the FRESCO
framework. Proposed by Ben-or et al. [30]. It is a proto-
col which describes a way to implement secure multiparty
computation for several logical operators. In particular, they
defined circuits for addition and multiplication, and created
a secret sharing scheme that would be secure in presence of
an adversary [31]. The protocol is based on Shamir’s Secret
Sharing Scheme; in particular, BGW tweaks certain rules of
Shamir’s schemes so that they can compute operations using
shares generated by the scheme. In general, secure computation
in BGW consists of three steps:
1) Input Sharing Stage:
In the input sharing stage, each party Pi creates a
share JuiK using threshold t+ 1 where t < n/2 and
distributes them among the parties.
2) Computation Stage: In this stage, parties jointly
compute a function f using the values they hold.
the function f
(
xi, ....xn
)
will return a output JoutiK.
Each JoutiK is a sharing of the true value out. The
function to be computed and their behavior depends
on the formula to be calculated.
3) Output Reconstruction Stage: In this stage, parties
collude and communicate to reconstruct the out-
put out by using shares of JoutiK from all parties
P0, , , , Pn parties. If only one party is required to
know the output, all parties send shares to the party
that is only allowed to know the output.
SPDZ is a protocol that was developed in 2012. It is
implemented in the FRESCO framework. The protocol d-
iffers from the BGW scheme in several ways, notably in
the use of Message Authentication Code (MAC) for authen-
ticating shares, and the use of a somewhat homomorphic
scheme
(
SHE
)
during preparation of values to be computed
in the protocol [32]. However SPDZ is also a secret sharing
scheme, like BGW. Computing operations like addition and
multiplication is different as compared to BGW with some
novel notable concepts. In particular SPDZ consists of a two
phase protocol: 1) Preprocessing Phase and 2) Online Phase.
3) The Contrasting Design Philosophies: Sharemind is
a commercial application design for commercial usage. In
contrast, FRESCO is open source, which allows anyone who
wishes to use or contribute to the framework instant access.
Since the system is time bounded, FRESCO’s instant usability
clearly is better suited. In addition, Sharemind’s design is as
a framework that provide a full suite of functions for secure
multiparty computation; this means that any application written
with Sharemind must be in Sharemind’s context. FRESCO,
however, envisions itself as a plug and play component in a
larger application. In this case, FRESCO is better suited for
the system’s purpose, as we also seek to evaluate the general
use of secure multi party computation frameworks.
VI. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
A. Evaluation of Protocols in FRESCO
FRESCO is a platform for secure multiparty computation
protocol implementations. In this section, the protocols imple-
mented in FRESCO 0.1.0 are evaluated and one protocol will
be chosen for the implementation of the home loan calcula-
tion application as described in Section IV. There are three
secure multiparty computation protocols that are implemented
in FRESCO. They are: Dummy, BGW protocol and SPDZ
protocol. The dummy protocol is a protocol that is used for
measuring FRESCO’s overhead. It provides zero security and
thus not usable for the actual home loan calculation application
for the system.
A major problem in FRESCO is that it does not allow
decimals in the framework. This applies to both SPDZ and
BGW. The SPDZ and BGW protocols were evaluated against
each other to determine which of the two protocols were to
be used in implementing the requirements as described in
Section IV. The implementation for both were studied by
creating a prototype application that does simple addition and
multiplication. These efforts are detailed in this section.
1) SPDZ: A prototype of SPDZ was attempted to evaluate
the protocol for use in the system. During the attempt to
build the prototype, flaws in the implementation of SPDZ was
discovered. These flaws are:
• The preprocessing phase was not implemented fully
in SPDZ.
• The utility class cannot parse specified SPDZ options
properly.
A working prototype of SPDZ was attempted but not
completed, as the actual implementation of SPDZ in FRESCO
is incomplete; while FRESCO has a method that lets a trusted
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party to generate the preprocessing requirements, using this
third party would violate privacy as we do not want the values
from each party to be known to any other party other then the
party inputting the values itself.
A prototype was created successfully for BGW that does
simple addition and multiplication. However, just like SPDZ,
flaws in the implementation of the protocol was discovered.
These flaws are:
• Negative values are not supported in BGW due to
implementation bugs.
• The framework’s utility class is unable to parse user
specified BGW options due to bugs.
• If a computation returns a negative value it returns the
modulus− (negativevalue).
These bugs and problems will be further explained later in
section VI-C1.
2) Choice of Protocol: BGW was chosen as the protocol
to use in FRESCO as it is the only protocol that does not
require any other party then the ones identified in Section IV.
In addition, the SPDZ implementation in FRESCO is still a
work in progress; examination of the implementation shows
that even though a method of doing the preprocessing phase
is implemented, it is not a proper implementation but a place-
holder for a future full implementation of the preprocessing
phase.
B. Actual Implementation of Application
There are two home loan calculation applications that were
produced for this system. One is based on a simple interest
scheme, and the other is based on a amortizing interest
scheme. This section presents the implementation of the home
loan application. Firstly, the definitions of each component
required for the home loan application will be first described
as follow. This will be followed by the actual explanation
of the application workflow in section VI-C, which lists the
components of the application in the order that it happens.
Firstly, to simplify the explanation of the implementation
of the application, we shall define some terms. We define the
BGW protocol stages as:
• the Input Sharing Stage as Stageinput
• the Computation Stage as Stagecompute
• the Output Reconstruction Stage as Stageoutput
Here, we define the terms relevant to the parties involved as
detailed in Section IV. We define the inputs from the party
buyer as follows:
• 30% of monthly salary as salary
• Repayment Period as Paymentperiod
• Chosen Flat’s minimum cash required as
requiredcash
• Chosen Flat’s minimum CPF amount needed as
CPFNeeded
• Chosen Flat’s maximum loanable as MaxLoanable
For the party bank, we define the inputs:
• Buyer’s Existing Debt as Debt
• Buyer’s Savings as Savings
• Interest rate of Loan as interest
For the party CPF we define its input amount usable in cpf
account as CPFUsable.
C. Application Workflow
Two versions of the home loan calculation application were
created for the system. The only difference between the two
is the calculation of the monthly installment; namely simple
interest and amortizing interest schemes. Apart from the
formula used to calculate the interest, the two versions are the
same. This section will detail the generic application work
flow for both versions and detail the differences where it
happens.
1) Assumptions of Application: This home loan calculation
application will work under a few assumptions based on the
bugs that were identified in FRESCO’s implementation of
BGW. They are:
• savings ≥ requiredcash
• if the result of any computation is more than
60,000,000,000, it is a negative value. This value is
defined as bound
We assume that when a buyer wants to calculate the home
loan cost using the application, he should know that he has
enough money in his savings to calculate his costs required.
To address the bug of BGW returning the modulus, we
assume any number above a certain threshold is a negative
value. We take the number 60,000,000,000 for our threshold
as it is sufficiently high enough such that it is improbable that
the value returned by modulus−60, 000, 000, 000 is a realistic
number.
2) Gathering Input: The application will first require users
to identify themselves. This is done through a command line
interface, requiring users to input a number that identifies the
party that the user is. Each party runs on a different address
port based on their party identification ID. The network address
for the three different parties in the application is set in the
code; all parties are required to know the address of all other
parties so that they can share their inputs with each other for
the Computation Stage.
After specifying the party, the user of the application will
be prompted to enter values based on the party that they
have identified as. For example, a user of an application who
identifies himself as the CPF party has to input the CPFusable
amount. Although discussed in Section IV some parties’ values
need not be secure, the application will still use the networking
implementation in FRESCO to simplify the implementation.
At the end of this part, each party should have their values
usable in this stage.
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3) Calculating the Home Loan: After gathering all inputs
required, we use FRESCO’s networking implementation to in-
voke Stageinput for secret sharing the inputs among all parties.
Using these inputs, we begin the actual secure computation to
determine the home loans, as shown in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2: FRESCO-based Home Loan Calculator Application
The payment for a loan can be divided into the 20% down-
payment and 80% loanable amount. In the 20% downpayment,
at least 5% is required to be paid by cash, with the rest being
payable by a buyer’s CPF account. This 5% is a lower bound,
and can be higher if the buyer wishes so.
However, we wish to check if the CPF account has enough
money to be able to afford the house. We do so by the
following formula fcheckCPF :
CPFusable + (savings− downpayment)−
CPFneeded
We also wish to determine the monthly installment for a
amortizing home loan. We do so by the following formula
famortize:
A = P · r(1+r)n(1+r)n−1
where r = interest/12/100 and n = Paymentperiod.
This formula requires division and exponential functions,
both of which are not defined in the BGW protocol nor im-
plemented in FRESCO. We solve this by doing the calculation
using values that are opened and known to the public, where
traditional Java has functions for division and exponentials.
We thus have to reveal the values interest, paymentperiod
and the result of fcheckCPF .
Alternatively, in another version of the application we use
a simple interest loan calculation. This formula fsimple is
P×r
n
Finally, we also wish to compute the TDSR of a buyer. We
do so by the formula ftdsr:
salary − debt−monthlyinstallment
Algorithm 1 shows how the functions that are securely
computed after the parties provide their respective inputs. All
parties have shares of every input (line 4).
Algorithm 1 High level description of Application Secure
Computation Implementation
1: All parties input their values and identities into the appli-
cation.
2: All parties invoke Stageinput to secret share their inputs
among all parties.
3: Calculating using BGW - the steps in this section is done
in a secure way.
4: We construct a circuit Ccomputecpf to compute fcheckCPF
by setting CPFexcess ← CPFusable + (savings −
downpayment)− CPFneeded.
5: We then construct a circuit CrevealCPF to reveal the secret
value CPFexcess.
6: We compute the amount loanable by constructing a cir-
cuit Cloanable computing loanable ← MaxLoanable −
CPFexcess.
7: We then construct a circuit Crevealloanable to reveal the
secret value loanable.
8: Finally, we wish to compute ftdsr. Since installment
is not known until the full computation is computed,
first construct circuit Cloanlimit computing loanlimit ←
salary − debt.
9: Construct circuit Creveallimit that reveals the secret value
loanlimit.
10: Construct circuit Creveal that reveals secret values
paymentperiod, interest
11: Glue the circuits together in the order Ccomputecpf ,
CrevealCPF , Cloanable, Crevealloanable, Cloanlimit,
Creveallimit and evaluate them.
Because of operation limitations of the protocol, we have to
compute famortize and ftdsr using secret values made public.
This computation will happen after Algorithm 1. Algorithm 2
details how the application considers if a buyer is eligible to
buy a flat and the calculations required.
Algorithm 2 High level description of Application Non Secure
Implementation
Require: Algorithm 1 was complete prior to this algorithm.
Ensure: Output that reveals the installment of the loan if
buyer is eligible.
1: After Algorithm 1, we have revealed values CPFexcess,
loanable, loanlimit, paymentperiod and interest.
2: Compute famoritize using paymentperiod, loanable
and interest by installment ←
loanable interest(1+interest)
paymentperiod
(1+interest)paymentperiod−1 .
3: Compute TDSR TDSR← loanlimit− installment.
4: Check if downpayment > bound. If so this means that
the downpayment is insufficient. Return an error message
informing user that CPF is insufficient and exit.
5: Check if TDSR > bound If returns true then this means
that TDSR is a negative value, which means the user
cannot get another loan. Return an error message that
TDSR has been exceeded.
6: If none of the conditions evaluate to true, return the
installment value installment to the user.
The application algorithm starts with Algorithm 1 and
then Algorithm 2. These algorithms describe the amortizing
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interest version of the home loan application. For the simple
interest version, the difference is adding a step to Algorithm
1 to calculate loanable× interest and in step 2 of Algorithm
2; replace the formula with fsimple.
Figure 3 shows the activity diagram of the application.
Computation of the loan is done not in FRESCO’s MPC
framework, the reasons of which are explained in Section
VI-C1.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section discusses the evaluation of the feasibility of
using the FRESCO framework to build a full application. We
conduct an Efficiency Evaluation to decide if the computa-
tional overhead of FRESCO is suitable for use in a full fledge
application. The experiments were conducted on a machine
with the following specs: Windows 10 Home with Intel Core
i7-4720HQ Processor, 16GB RAM and JVM heap size 2GB.
A. Efficiency Evaluation
A evaluation was done on the efficiency of the framework.
This was done by two experiments, measuring the time for
encrypting values for secret sharing and measuring the time
taken for computing an operation.
1) Measuring Time taken for Encrypting Values: In this
experiment, FRESCO’s secret sharing implementation is e-
valuated. In particular, the time taken to encrypt a value for
secret sharing is evaluated. In addition, we wish to evaluate if
high values could be efficiently transformed to its encrypted
secret shared form. The experiment was conducted by coding
a custom test application that only encrypts the values that
are retrieved from the various parties, with time measurement
using Java’s System.currentTimeMillis() function. A variable
scale was used to scale up the values, in order to determine
if higher values would yield different timings of the function.
Time Required to Encrypt Values
Time Required to Encrypt 
Values
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1 100 1000 10,000 100,000 1000000 10,000,000
Scale of Value
2138 2100.67 2083.34 2031
2171.67 2139.34 2082
Fig. 4: Results from Measuring Time Taken for Encrypting the
Values
The results were then plotted out in a graph in Figure 4.
Figure 4 shows that the time taken to encrypt the data remains
a constant regardless of how the values are scaled; This implies
that the secret sharing implementation of BGW by FRESCO
is a constant time implementation, which is quite efficient as
the time taken is also quite low.
2) Measuring Time taken for Computing Addition: In this
experiment, the potential overhead of operations in FRESCO’s
BGW implementation was evaluated. For this experiment, the
addition operation was selected for evaluation. The experiment
also evaluates and verifies if more addition operations would
lead to cause an exponential overhead during computation.
The experiment was conducted with a custom application
that does addition according to Algorithm 3. In addition,
another application was created to compute simple addition
using the same idea as Step 3 of algorithm 3 but in a non
secure traditional way in Java for comparison and context to
the time of the application. A scaling factor of 10 was used to
increase the number of additions for the experimentation.
Algorithm 3 Addition Method for Experimentation
Require: Number of times addition is to be done defined as
rounds.
1: Invoke Stageinput to get a value val to compute addition.
2: Start Timer.
3: Create a circuit C to based on the number of rounds
specified.
4: This is done using a for loop and assigning val = val+val
for each round.
5: Execute circuit C.
6: Stop timer and print out time taken.
Fig. 5: Results from Measuring Time Taken for Computing
Addition
The result of the experiment was plotted onto a graph
shown in Figure 5. The results show that having more additions
seem to be a exponential in time. Compared to traditional
addition in Java, the time overhead cost of addition in BGW
is noticeably higher, but still efficient. Efficiency only peaks
at 1 million addition operations, which is a upper bound that
is hard to reach for a conventional application
Fig. 6: Results from Measuring Time Taken for Computing
Addition (No of Additions 2 - 1000)
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Get input values based on party
Create circuit to compute excess money usable from downpayment
Input Sharing Stage
Create Circuit to compute the final loanable amount
Create Circuit to determine TDSR without instalment
Combine the circuits and evaluate them
Add installment to TDSR calculated in FRESCO
Calculate installment using amoritzation formula
Print  “not eligible ”
check excess money usable from downpayment > bound
check TDSR > bound
Print the installment value
FRESCO Framework
Print “TDSR  exceeded”
[false]
[false]
[true]
[true]
Fig. 3: Activity Diagram of the Home Loan Computation Application
While at first glance more addition operations seem like
having exponential time overhead, examination of the smaller
values reveals that the the time overhead may be linear instead.
Since the experiment uses a scaling factor of 10, each time
the number of additions round is scaled the values are scaled
exponentially. This might have affected the findings, and more
values could be used to better determine the time overhead
of the additions. However, the Figure 6 also shows a linear
best fit line for the values. In addition with the observation of
the smaller values, we can conclude that the time overhead of
addition is a steep linear function.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The aim of this paper was to implement a MPC scenario
and use it to evaluate the practicality of existing MPC frame-
works. Encryption over MPC is done within 2 to 2.5 Seconds.
Up to 10,000 addition operations, MPC system performs very
well and most applications will be sufficient within 10,000
additions. We believe that this aim was sufficiently achieved,
but more work can be done to evaluate more frameworks
and their implementations. For example, a implementation of
SPDZ has been released on github by the institution that first
proposed it [33]. Secure Multiparty Computation is a field
which has indirect links to other sections of cryptography.
We believe that elements of MPC, like secret sharing, can be
used in tandem with other cryptographic techniques to enhance
them, like key management schemes. In addition, MPC is
based on homomorphic properties. The recent advances in
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is also a potential
avenue of further study.
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